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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Review by Appellant, Richard Grint, is from a final order of the 
Labor Commission of Utah dated January 17, 2006 and an Order Denying Reconsideration 
dated February 28,2006. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 34A-2-801(8)(a), 63-46b-16, and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2006). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Did the Commission correctly determine that Grint failed to raise and 
adjudicate properly the issue of increased compensation rate? 
Standard of Review: Whether a party properly raises an issue as part of his or her 
case is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See Hilton Hotel v. Industrial 
Commission, 897 P.2d 352, 356 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). However,n[t]he Legislature has 
granted the Commission discretion to determine the facts and apply the law to the facts" and 
this court will uphold the Commission's determination unless it "exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality." Acosta v. Labor Comm'n, 2002 UT App 67, ^ [11 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2002). 
2. Issue: Did Commission err in refusing to accept post-hearing evidence? 
Standard of Review: The Court should review the Commission's refusal to consider 
additional evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Morris v. Parkinson, 2001 UT App 69 
(Utah Ct. App. 2001). Such standard applies in administrative proceedings as well. See 
Jepson v. Div. of Occupational & Prof 1 Licensing, 2005 UT App 316 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). 
I 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The determinative case law is Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Commission. 897 P.2d 
352, 356 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). There, the Utah Court of Appeals held "it is error to 
adjudicate issues not raised before or during trial and not supported by the record. The 
trial court is not privileged to determine matters outside the issues of the case, and if he 
does, his findings will have no force or effect." Id. 
Additionally, section 63-46b-8(l)(d) of the Utah Code requires all parties be 
afforded the "opportunity to present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross examination, 
and submit rebuttal evidence". Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(l)(d). Similarly, the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 7 of the 
Utah State Constitution afford parties due process of law. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV; 
Utah Const.. Art. 1 §7. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This worker's compensation case arose on July 22, 1983 when Mr. Grint 
(hereinafter "Grint" or "Appellant") fell off a truck and injured his elbow. At the time of 
this injury, Grint was 23-years old, married, and had two dependent children. Grint was 
employed on a part time basis, and his average weekly wage was $60.00. 
Unfortunately, over the years, Grint has undergone numerous surgical procedures 
(up to 39 by one count) on his elbow. His medical expenses have been paid in the amount 
of $237,160.04. He received indemnity benefits over many years of $55.00 per week, 
without complaint or dispute by Grint. Grint was rated on June 15, 1984 by Dr. Jonathan 
Home as having a 14% whole body impairment and that impairment was paid at the same 
indemnity rate, again without dispute by Grint. In total, Grint was paid $14,907.85 in 
indemnity benefits. 
On November 20, 2003, over 20 years following his industrial injury, Grint was 
given an increased impairment rating of 44% whole body. Trimco denied liability for this 
increased impairment based upon the applicable statute of limitations. In response, Grint 
filed an Application for Hearing with the Labor Commission of Utah. 
At the Labor Commission hearing, Grint limited his claim to the increased 
impairment rating. The Labor Commission, overturning the Administrative Law Judge, 
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denied Grint's claim for increased benefits. The Labor Commission also denied Grint's 
request, post-hearing, to adjudicate Grint's claim of a higher average weekly wage. 
Grint has appealed this limited issue to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Course of the Proceedings 
On March 1, 2004, acting pro se, Richard Grint filed an Application for Hearing 
alleging entitlement to worker's compensation benefits arising from an accident that 
occurred while working at Trimco on July 22, 1983. See R., 1. The claim made by Mr. 
Grint was for additional permanent partial disability compensation for a 44% impairment 
rating which had been denied by Trimco and it's insurance carrier, Argonaut Insurance, 
based upon the applicable statute of limitations. His second claim was for unpaid medical 
expenses. Trimco filed a formal Answer denying these claims on May 21, 2004. See R., 
12-15. 
On February 16, 2005, an evidentiary hearing was held before an Administrative 
Law Judge at which time Grint limited his claim to the increased impairment rating. See 
R., 127-189. 
On March 23, 2005, the Administrative Law Judge issued his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order awarding not only the increased impairment of 44%, but 
also making awards that were outside of the claims actually litigated by the parties at 
hearing. This order included a retroactive and prospective increase in the claimant's 
wage rate from $55.00 to $202.00, temporary total disability, and interest. See R., 24-28. 
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On April 22, 2005, Trimco filed a Motion for Review of this Order arguing that 
the ALJ erred in sua sponte adjudicating issues not raised by the parties at hearing. See 
R.9 29-86. On June 27, 2005, Grint, now represented by counsel, filed a Response to this 
Motion for Review and attached documents, which were not part of the trial record, 
which he claims are supportive of the ALJ's ruling. See R., 95-198. 
On January 17, 2006, the Commission issued an Order Granting Motion for 
Review, reversing the ALJ's Order, holding that Grint did not appropriately raise his 
claim for the increased compensation rate. See R., 222-27. Thereafter, Grint filed a 
Request for Reconsideration, followed by a Reply from Trimco. See R., 228-51, 254-59. 
On February 28, 2006, the Commission entered an Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration. See R., 264-66. Grint has since filed a Petition for Review with the 
Utah Court of Appeals stemming from the Commission's Orders denying this claim.. 
Statement of i4 acts 
The factual history of this case is set forth in detail in the Commission's Order 
Granting Motion for Review. In relevant part, the history of this case is as follows: 
Richard Grint, the Appellant, sustained an industrial injury while working as an 
unskilled laborer for Trimco Molding on July 22, 1983. On that date, Trimco was insured 
by Argonaut Insurance Company (referred collectively as "Trimco"). The industrial 
accident occurred when Grint fell off of a truck and injured his right elbow. At the time 
of that accident Grint was 23-years old, married, with two dependent children. He had 
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been employed part-time by Trimco for five months as a warehouseman, working three 
days per week earning $4.00 per hour, with an average weekly wage of $60.00, at the 
time of injury. (R., 52-65). 
At the time of this accident, the Labor Commission's state average weekly wage 
was $300.00 per week. This equates to an hourly rate of $7.50 per hour working forty 
hours per week. The minimum wage in 1983 was just over $3.00 per hour. 
Trimco accepted liability for the industrial accident and paid Mr. Grint's medical 
expenses of $237,160.04. Trimco also paid a total of $14,907.85 in indemnity benefits 
(ie., temporary total temporary partial disability, and permanent partial disability 
compensation). This figure includes payment for a 24% upper extremity impairment 
rating (equating to a 14% whole person impairment) in the amount of $2,488.00, and the 
remaining amounts represent temporary total and temporary partial disability benefits. 
Indemnity benefits were paid based upon a rate of $55.00 per week ($60.00 x 2/3 = 
$40.00 + 15 for dependents = $55.00). (R., 54-62). For twenty years, the parties were in 
agreement that Grint's weekly wage was $60.00 per week. 
On March 1, 2004, Grint,^ro se, filed an Application for Hearing and later an 
Amended Application for Hearing on March 25, 2004 seeking additional medical J 
expenses, temporary total disability, temporary partial, and permanent partial disability 
compensation for the injuries he suffered in the 1983 accident. (R., 1). Such filing was 
prompted by Trimco's denial of additional permanent partial disability due to the passing 
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of the applicable statute of limitations. In his Application for Hearing, Grint alleged an 
hourly rate at the time of accident of $14.00 per hour working 40 hours per week. 
Trimco filed an Answer to the Application for Hearing on May 21, 2004. (R., 12-
15). In the Answer, Trimco specifically denied further entitlement to temporary total 
(TTD), temporary partial disability (TPD) and permanent partial disability (PPD) 
compensation asserting that under the applicable 1983 statutes, no TTD, TPD and PPD 
benefits are allowed after a period of 8-years from the date of injury. Trimco also denied 
Grinf s asserted wage rate based upon file records showing a weekly wage of $60.00. 
On February 16, 2005, Administrative Law Judge Dale Sessions held and 
evidentiary hearing at which time Grint represented himself, pro se. At that time, Grint 
explicitly narrowed his claim to additional permanent partial disability and medical 
expenses. (R., 128, 163-65, 178). Grint presented no argument nor any evidence 
regarding his increased compensation claim. (R., 127-190, generally). When Trimco's 
attorney summarized the issues in the case, the following testimony was elicited: 
Mr. Dyer: . . . .[T]he rating from Dr. Martin is obviously increased, so the 
question is, ok, do we owe the increase [ie., 44% rating]? The law at 
the time in 1981 allowed for 8 years of obtaining permanent partial 
impairment, and my client takes the view that it's now beyond 8 
years since 1983, you know, long beyond that. So, we recognize that 
there is no statute of limitations for a perm total claim . . . . but Mr. 
Grint isn't claiming total permanent total disability benefits. . . . The 
only claim for benefits is for the increase in impairment and, 
unfortunately, under the law, he's not entitled to an increase this far 
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down the road. But it is that total permanent impairment that I am 
seeking claim for that increase in total permanent impairment.1 
The Court: Well. 
Mr. Grint: Not seeking _ 
Mr. Dyer: Permanent partial impairment is what it's called. 
The Court: (Inaudible). 
Mr. Dyer: Right, right, so, frankly, his rate, at 55 dollars per week is comp rate. 
The increase [for the additional impairment rating submitted by Dr. 
Martin] is only worth about 4 thousand dollars. It's not even 
something that we['d] probably fight over other than the fact that it's 
kind of apparent [under] the law that that's the way it is. Given the 
fact that we've paid almost two hundred thousand dollars just in 
medicals on this case. 
Mr. Grint. Right. 
(R., 137-39). 
At the hearing, Judge Sessions inquired as to whether Grint might pursue a claim 
for permanent total disability benefits, given the considerable number of surgeries 
performed on Grint's elbow. In this regard the Administrative Law Judge noted that 
Grint had recently graduated from the University of Utah and was not claiming 
entitlement to permanent total disability benefits. Similarly, after questioning Grint 
1
 Trimco notes that, although the transcript indicates that Attorney Dyer uttered the 
last sentence in this paragraph, Attorney Dyer recalls that it was Grint that made this 
statement. The content of the transcript also points to Grint as the speaker of the last 
sentence. Attorney Dyer believes that the transcript, as reported, reflects a simple 
transcription error by the court reporter. 
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relative to his claim, the Administrative Law Judge noted that Grint was only concerned 
about the increase in his permanent impairment rating. (Grint had been paid a 14% whole 
body impairment rating in 1985, but by November 2003 had received a new impairment 
rating of 44% whole body.) The Administrative Law Judge also noted that medical 
expenses were at issue, but he acknowledged that Trimco was in agreement to pay all 
ongoing reasonable and necessary medical expenses relating to the claimed industrial 
accident. Thus, based upon the Administrative Law Judge's inquiry with Grint at the 
time of the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge noted in his Order ". . . . that we 
proceed on the Amended Application for Hearing which advances only the issue of 
increased impairment in permanent partial disability at a rate [meaning impairment rating] 
higher than the original rate." (R., 25). 
During the hearing, the ALJ did not ask Grint about the higher wages claimed in 
his Application for Hearing, nor did Grint proffer any testimony or evidence in this 
regard. In concluding proceedings. Judge Sessions asked 'is there anything else that you 
think needs to come out of this hearing Mr. Grint[?]v Grint responded "I think that pretty 
much covers it. . ." (R., 163). 
On March 23, 2005, Judge Sessions issued his decision (the "Order"). (R., 24-28). 
Despite the limited scope of issues Mr. Grint had identified at the hearing, Judge Sessions 
1) retroactively increased the indemnity rate of Mr. Grint's temporary total disability and 
permanent partial disability compensation to reflect change from $55.00 to $202.00 per 
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week; 2) awarded temporary total disability at the increased indemnity rate of $202.00 per 
week from July 23, 1983, for 312 weeks; 3) awarded additional permanent partial 
disability compensation at an increased rate of $207.00 for Mr. Grint's current 
impairment rating2; 4) awarded interest on all unpaid disability compensation; and, 5) 
ordered Trimco to pay medical expenses. 
On April 22, 2005 Trimco filed a Motion for Review of the ALJ's Order. (R., 29-
86). Trimco asserted that the ALJ erred by addressing issues not raised by Grint and by 
awarding an increase in permanent partial disability following the lapsing of the 
applicable statute of limitations. At that time, Grint retained legal counsel, Richard 
Burke. 
On June 27, 2005, Grint filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for 
Review. (R., 95-98). To this memorandum Grint attached post-hearing evidence which 
included a sworn affidavit with exhibits, including what he purports are paystubs from 
Trimco at the time of the industrial accident. Although contained in the record at pages 
120-125, these exhibits have not been properly admitted into evidence and were stricken 
by the Commission. 
On July 26. 2005, Trimco filed a Reply Memorandum. (R., 200-209). 
2
 It appears that the ALJ intended to write $200, which was the statutory maximum 
permanent partial disability rate for the July 23, 1983 date of injury. 
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On July 28, 2005, Grint filed a Motion to Strike the Reply Memorandum. (R., 210-
221). 
On January 17, 2006, the Commission entered an Order Granting Motion for 
Review. (R., 222-227). The Commission held that it had carefully reviewed the record 
noting that only two issues were submitted to the ALJ for decision: (1) Mr. Grint's right 
to medical benefits and (2) his right to additional permanent partial disability 
compensation for an increased impairment rating (i.e., the 44% whole person rating of Dr. 
Martin, less the 14% rating previously paid in permanent partial disability). The 
Commission held that the ALJ erroneously went beyond those two issues to increase the 
rate of compensation from $55.00 to $202 (and $207), both retroactively and 
prospectively, and to award additional temporary total disability. The Commission noted 
in its footnote that: 
The record on this matter illustrates the necessity of limiting decisions 
to those issues actually raised during the hearing process. Because no 
one identified compensation rate or duration of temporary total 
disability as disputed issues, no evidence or argument was presented on 
those issues. Consequently, when Judge Sessions addressed those issues 
sua sponte, he relied on incomplete evidence and reached conclusions 
that may be significantly inaccurate. 
(R., 223, Emphasis added). 
In addition, the Commission held that the ALJ also erred in determining one of the 
remaining issues that was actually litigated - that is, Mr. Grint" s right to an award of 
additional permanent partial disability. The Commission held that because Mr. Grint's 
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accident occurred in 1983, his right to permanent partial disability was governed by Utah 
Code Ann. 35-1-66 (1983). That law allowed an award of permanent partial disability at 
any time prior to eight years after the date of injury. Since the Grint's Application for 
Hearing was filed nearly 22 years after the date of injury, the Commission determined that 
his right to additional permanent partial disability was barred by law. (Petitioner has not 
challenged this issue on appeal). 
On February 3, 2006, Grint filed a Request for Reconsideration. (R., 228-251). 
On February 8, 2006 the Commission entered and Order Extending Time for 
Reconsideration. (R., 252-253). 
On February 17, 2006 Trimco filed a Response to Request for Reconsideration (R., 
254-259). 
On March 1, 2006 Grint filed a Reply. (R., 260-263). 
On February 28, 2006 the Commission entered an Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration. (R., 264-266). The Commission held: 
The essential fact missing from Mr. Grint9 s argument is that, at the 
beginning of the evidentiary hearing on his claim, Mr. Grint 
affirmatively stated to Judge Sessions and Trimco that the claim was 
limited to permanent partial disability compensation for an increased 
impairment rating. Consequently, neither party submitted evidence or 
argument on any other issues, nor did Judge Sessions inquire into any 
other issues. 
In light of the limits Mr. Grint placed on his claim, Trimco was not 
required to produce evidence on any other issues. Judge Sessions 
erred, not by failing to pursue other issues during the evidentiary 
hearing, but in later deciding additional issues that Mr. Grint had 
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excluded from consideration. And because such additional issues were 
waived by Mr. Grint, the Commission will not consider post-hearing 
evidence on those issues [i.e., affidavit and wage records contained in 
R., 120-125]. 
(R., 264-265, Emphasis added). 
On March 17, 2006, Grint filed a Petition for Review with this Court seeking 
review from the January 17, 2006 and February 28, 2006 Order and of the Labor 
Commission. 
A Docketing Statement was filed on April 7, 2006 followed by his Appellant's 
Brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Commission properly determined that Grint limited the scope of issues to be 
resolved by the ALJ to include medical expenses and a new permanent partial disability 
impairment which totaled 44% whole person. The Commission correctly found that the 
ALJ erred in addressing additional issues regarding Grint* s compensation rate that were 
never raised at hearing and supported by evidence. In addition, the Commission acted 
within its discretion in refusing to accept post-hearing evidence consisting of affidavits 
and alleged pay stubs. To rule to the contrary would have been a violation of section 63-




A, THE COMMISSION PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT GRINT LIMITED 
THE SCOPE OF ISSUES TO INCLUDE MEDICAL EXPENSES AND 
ADDITIONAL PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY FOR AN 
INCREASED IMPAIRMENT RATING. 
Grint argues that the Commission erred in refusing to award him retroactive 
permanent partial disability compensation at a higher compensation rate based upon the 
average weekly wage of $280.00 ($14.00 per hour x 20 hours) as claimed in his 
Application for Hearing. Specifically, he challenges the Commission's determination that 
he failed to properly "raise" the issue of an increased compensation rate. Citing to Utah 
R. Civ. P. 8, the Utah Code, and Utah Rules of Administrative Procedure, Grint asserts 
that he properly "raised" the issue of increased rate based upon the allegations made in his 
Application for Hearing (where he alleges an income of $14.00 per hour) and because 
Trimco responded to that allegation in their Answer by stating that they asserted a weekly 
wage rate of $60.00 (based upon an hourly rate of $4.00). Trimco disagrees. 
First, Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil procedure does not support Grint's 
allegations. This rule does not indicate that an issue is properly ripe for determination by 
a judge when a party alleges a fact in his or her pleadings. Rather, that rule simply notes 
the general rules for pleadings. Similarly, neither section 34A-2-801, U.C.A., nor Rule 
602-2-1 of the Utah Administrative Rules provide any support for Grint's argument. 
Rather, the Commission correctly relied upon Hilton Hotel v. Industrial 
Commission. 897 P.2d 352 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) where the Court of Appeals addressed a 
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scenario similar to the present one. There, the Court of Appeals struck down an 
administrative agency decision that adjudicated an issue that had not been properly raised 
in the adjudicative proceedings before the agency. In that case, the Court reiterated the 
well-settled principle that: 
it is error to adjudicate issues not raised before or during trial and 
unsupported by the record. The trial court is not privileged to determine 
matters outside the issues of the case, and if he [or she] does, his [or her] 
findings will have no force or effect. In law or in equity, a judgment must 
be responsive to the issues framed by the pleadings, [** 12] and a trial court 
has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented for 
determination. Any findings rendered outside the issues are a nullity." 
Raising an issue not addressed by the parties is inappropriate and outside of 
the discretion given the governing tribunal because it encroaches upon the 
advocate responsibility conferred upon counsel. Id. at 421. Furthermore, if a 
party fails to raise an issue and present evidence regarding the same, it has 
waived the right to do so. Thus, '"the interests of justice are not enhanced 
when the court exceeds its role as arbiter by reaching out and deciding an 
issue that would otherwise be dead, [**13] it not having been litigated at 
the time of trial.'" 
Id. at 356 (internal citations omitted). 
The Court similarly ruled in Chevron v. Tax Commission. 847 P.2d 418 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993), that the Division did not advance a theory in its briefs or argument, but rather 
only raised a concern following the Court's Order. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held 
that Chevron was not given the opportunity to present evidence regarding this issue or 
argue against it. The Court of Appeals held that mere "passing reference" was 
insufficient. 
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Likewise, in Acosta v. Labor Comm'n. 2002 UT App 67, P31-P33 (Utah Ct. App. 
2002), the Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission that it is inappropriate for an 
ALJ or Commission to raise other theories (in that case, cumulative trauma or cumulative 
exertion), to justify an award of benefits. There the Court held: 
We agree with Respondents that the Commission acted reasonably and 
rationally in its application of the law to the facts of this case in reversing 
the ALJ's award of benefits. First, as noted by the Commission, under 
Hilton Hotel it was improper for the ALJ to raise the cumulative trauma 
theory on his own because doing so denied Respondents "the opportunity to 
present evidence and challenge this type of claim." 897 P.2d at 356. Acosta, 
in her pleadings and correspondence, failed to raise the cumulative trauma 
or cumulative exertion she experienced in her workplace. n3 Instead, she 
relied on the one specific instance on December 20, 1998, when she lifted 
one eight pound infant and turned to hand the child to its mother. Second, a 
single lift of one eight pound infant is not enough to satisfy the Allen test. 
In fact, HN17the Allen court itself, in listing examples of ordinary exertions 
of nonemployment life, specifically mentioned that "lifting a small child to 
chest height" was a "typical nonemployment [***25] activity . . . generally 
expected in today's society." Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. 
- Footnotes 
n3 In her "First Report of Injury," filed with the Commission, Acosta, in 
answering how the injury occurred, replied: "Lifting a baby to crib, twisted 
back." (Emphasis added.) She also named a specific date, December 20, 
1998, and a specific time of the occurrence, 10:00 a.m. In the "Physician's 
Initial Report," also filed with the Commission, under the section captioned 
"Employee's Statement of Cause of Injury," is written: "Lifting an infant 
from an isolette." (Emphasis added.) In her application for hearing, Acosta 
described the accident occurring as follows: "I was lifting a baby out of an 
isolet [sic] to hand to its mother." 
Just as in Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Comm'n, 897 P.2d 352, 356 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995), the way this injury was characterized by the claimant precluded 
the ALJ from raising a cumulative trauma theory sua sponte. 
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End Footnotes 
[*P34] Hence, because Acosta cannot rely on [***26] a cumulative trauma 
theory, and the Allen court itself specifically rejected lifting a small child to 
chest height as an unusual or extraordinary exertion, the Commission acted 
reasonably and rationally in denying her claim for workers' compensation benefits. 
Id at H133-34 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n. 
947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997) (issues not raised in proceedings before administrative 
agencies are not subject to judicial review except in exceptional circumstances). 
In its Order Granting Motion for Review, the Labor Commission correctly ruled 
that the Administrative Law Judge's Order impermissibly adjudicated issues not raised by 
Mr. Grint. The Commission accurately determined that, at the evidentiary hearing on 
February 16, 2005, Mr. Grint ". . . . explicitly narrowed his claim to additional permanent 
partial disability compensation and medical expenses." (Labor Commission Order at 1.) 
Because Grint was representing himself at the hearing, Judge Sessions spent a good deal 
of time examining with Grint the claim that he wished to pursue. For example, given the 
considerable number of surgeries performed on Grint's elbow, Judge Sessions inquired as 
to whether Grint might pursue a claim for permanent total disability benefits. In this 
regard the Administrative Law Judge noted that Grint had recently graduated from the 
University of Utah and was not claiming entitlement to permanent total disability 
benefits. 
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Although Grint's Application for Hearing lists his purported wage rate, this matter 
was not an issue "presented for determination" by him nor did Grint present any evidence 
at hearing necessary under Hilton to support this claim. Given this lack of argument and 
lack of supporting evidence, no rebuttal was offered by Trimco. 
Grint argues that it was the ALJ's duty to inquire as to his compensation claim 
based upon section 63-46b-8(l) of the Utah Code, which provides that an ALJ shall 
regulate a hearing and afford all parties a reasonable opportunity to present their 
positions. Trimco does not agree. To impose the burden of going forward on the judge is 
certainly not required by law. Indeed, section 63-46b-8(l)(d) of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act indicates that the presiding officer shall afford all parties the opportunity 
to "present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal 
evidence." The ALJ acted within these parameters and gave Grint the opportunity to 
present evidence and argument on this issue. Grint simply chose not to do so at that time. 
Grint would now have this Court believe that the ALJ failed to conduct the 
administrative hearing properly. Grint's position, however, is not supported by the facts 
of this case. In fact, given that Grint was not represented by legal counsel, the ALJ 
questioned Grint relative to his claim. (Under normal circumstances, an injured worker, 
through counsel presents his claim to the Court, with the ALJ asking few, if any, 
questions of the injured worker). The Administrative Law Judge noted that Grint was 
only concerned about the increase in his permanent impairment rating (not his 
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compensation rate).3 The Administrative Law Judge also acknowledged that medical 
expenses were at issue, but he acknowledged that Trimco was in agreement to pay all 
ongoing reasonable and necessary medical expenses relating to the claimed industrial 
accident. Thus, based upon the Administrative Law Judge's inquiry with Grint at the 
time of the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge noted in his Order ". . . . that we 
proceed on the Amended Application for Hearing which advances only the issue of 
increased impairment in permanent partial disability at a rate [i.e., impairment rating] 
higher than the original rate." (ALJ Order at 2, emphasis added.). In fact, when 
Trimco's attorney summarized the issues in the case, the following testimony was 
elicited: 
Mr. Dyer: . . . .[T]he rating from Dr. Martin is obviously increased, so the 
question is, ok, do we owe the increase [ie., 44% rating]? The law at 
the time in 1981 allowed for 8 years of obtaining permanent partial 
impairment, and my client takes the view that it's now beyond 8 
years since 1983, you know, long beyond that. So, we recognize that 
there is no statute of limitations for a perm total claim . . . . but Mr. 
Grint isn't claiming total permanent total disability benefits. . . . The 
only claim for benefits is for the increase in impairment and, 
unfortunately, under the law, he's not entitled to an increase this far 
down the road. But it is that total permanent impairment that I am 






 Grint had been paid a 14% whole body impairment rating in 1985, but by November 
2003 had a new impairment rating of 44% whole body. 
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Mr. Dyer: Permanent partial impairment is what it's called. 
The Court: (Inaudible). 
Mr. Dyer: Right, right, so, frankly, his rate, at 55 dollars per week is comp rate. 
The increase [for the additional impairment rating submitted by Dr. 
Martin] is only worth about 4 thousand dollars. It's not even 
something that we probably fight over other than the fact that it's 
kind of apparent [under] the law that that's the way it is. Given the 
fact that we've paid almost two hundred thousand dollars just in 
medicals on this case. 
Mr. Grint. Right.4 
(R.? 137-39). 
Under these circumstances, the Labor Commission was entirely justified in 
reaching the conclusion that the issue of average weekly wage was neither appropriately 
pled nor proven by Grint. 
Additionally, Trimco submits that the Court of Appeals should view Grint's 
request from a practical point of view. Grint was born on September 25, 1959, making 
him twenty-three years old at the time of this injury. It is also conceded that Grint w7as 
working only fifteen to twenty hours per week. In reviewing the Labor Commission's 
own documents as to the State of Utah's average weekly wage in 1983, that 
documentation indicates that 100% of the State's average weekly wage as of July 1, 1983 
was $300.00. This wage equates to an hourly rate of $7.50 an hour working forty hours 
per week. The minimum wage in 1983 was just over $3.00 per hour. Given this 
See footnote 1, supra. 
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information, it is difficult to believe that a twenty-three year old male, working only 
fifteen to twenty hours per week of unskilled labor in a warehouse, could nevertheless 
command an average weekly wage nearly 100% higher than the State's average weekly 
wage at the time of Grint's injury. In this regard it is significant to note that Grint had 
only been employed for approximately five months prior to his injury. The Labor 
Commission could similarly note that warehousemen - - even today - - do not earn $14.00 
per hour at the age of twenty-three with only five months of prior experience. Thus, the 
practical view in this case militates against conferring reliability upon Grint's current 
claim for a higher average weekly wage. 
Finally, Trimco submits that the Labor Commission's decision is supported by a 
twenty year history of agreement by the parties on the issue of average weekly wage. The 
evidence in this regard is overwhelming. It begins with the Employer's First Report of 
Injury which lists Grint's hourly wage at $4.00 per hour, working three days per week. 
See R., 52. It shows that Grinf s average weekly wage was $60.00, indicating that Grint 
was only working fifteen hours per week. See id. Moreover, following Grint's injury he 
was paid $14,907.85 in indemnity benefits at the rate of $55.00 per week. See R., 54-58. 
This money was not paid to Grint in a lump sum. Rather, it was paid to Grint in weekly 
benefits over many years. The total sum of these benefits amounts to 271 weeks of 
benefits paid to Grint over many years. It is certainly instructive that there was no 
evidence presented by Grint at the hearing showing an objection to these payments 
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throughout the years. In fact, Grint endorsed the rate of benefits he received in an 
interview with his case worker, Debi Johnson, on October 11, 1984. See R., 60. 
Additionally, Grint further endorsed formally his workers compensation rate in a 
Compensation Agreement signed by Grint on October 30, 1985 and approved by the 
Labor Commission. The weekly rate is also affirmed in a letter of December 27, 1990 to 
Grint by the adjuster. See R., 62, 64. In short, the Labor Commission's decision is 
justified by a twenty year history of payments in this case without any objection on the 
part of Grint. 
B. THE COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
REFUSING TO ACCEPT POST-HEARING EVIDENCE. 
Grint next argues that the Commission erred in rejecting post-hearing evidence 
consisting of Grint's Affivavit and his purported paystubs from Trimco Molding. On this 
point the Commission ruled in its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration: 
Judge Sessions erred, not by failing to pursue other issues during the 
evidentiary hearing, but later in deciding additional issues that Mr. Grint 
had excluded from consideration. And because such additional issues were 
waived by Mr. Grint, the Commission will not consider post-hearing 
evidence on those issues. 
R., 265. 
The Commission did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the post-hearing affidavit 
of Grint and purported pay stubs. To allow Grint to submit these documents after the 
record has been closed, when such issue was never before the ALJ, violates section 63-
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46b-8(l)(d) of the Utah Code which requires all parties be afforded the "opportunity to 
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross examination, and submit rebuttal 
evidence". Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(l)(d). To rule otherwise would violate Trimco's 
due process rights under both the Federal and State Constitutions. See U.S. Const., 
amend. XIV; Utah Const.. Art. 1 §7. 
Here, an evidentiary hearing was held on the claim and parties were allowed to 
present their evidence and argument as well as challenge each other's evidence and 
argument. The time for presentation of those documents was at the hearing. To accept 
additional evidence from Grint, after the evidentiary hearing has been concluded, would 
deprive Trimco of its right to "respond, conduct cross examination, and submit rebuttal 
evidence" and seriously impair the integrity of the adjudicatory process. Furthermore, it 
is evident that from the material submitted by Grint that he could have obtained and 
submitted this at the evidentiary hearing. Moreover, the evidence submitted by Grint post-
hearing has no obvious connection to Trimco Molding and, as the Commission correctly 
ruled, has only questionable value at best. 
As sole support for his position, Grint cites to Martinez v. Media-Paymaster, 117 
P.3d 1074 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). However, that case is inapposite to the present one. 
Martinez addresses whether the Commission erred in ignoring evidence presented at an 
administrative hearing. In this case, the documents presented by Grint were never 
presented at hearing. Since they were not presented, Trimco did not have the opportunity 
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to review and respond to these documents, conduct cross examination and submit rebuttal 
evidence. Given these basic due process considerations, the Commission acted well 
within its discretion in rejecting Grint's post-hearing evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Trimco respectfully urges the Court of Appeals to affirm the Commission's ruling 
on this case. The Commission's decision is supported by an unrebutted 20 year history of 
peace between the parties on this issue and Grint, upon specific questioning by the ALJ, 
did not raise this issue at the evidentiary hearing. Moreover, a practical view of Grint's 
current claim shows that his claim is unreliable and not supported by properly admitted 
evidence. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of November, 2006. 
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